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Thaler and Sunstein (2008) introduce two stereotypical decision makers: the 
Econs, imaginary people who always behave as strictly rational expected utility 
maximizers, and the Humans, real people subject to ordinary behavioral biases. 
This note sheds light on how the axiomatic target-oriented approach introduced 
by Castagnoli and Li Calzi (1996) may fit well the behavior of both of them. We 
show that although Econs and Humans use a different language, they maximize 
the same functional, e.g. the probability of meeting the goal. So declaring the 
probability distribution of the goal permits to elicit the agent utility function. A 
number of different distributions for goals are discussed and the family of the 
skew normal ones is proposed for its user-friendly flexibility. We show how 
moving the skewness parameter along its range every stereotypical decision 
maker’s profile may be modelled. 
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   Thaler and Sunstein (2008) introduce the notions of perceptive architecture 
(which influences what people perceive), prospective architecture (which 
influences what people consider) and choice architecture (which influences what 
people choose). Based on these architectures, they introduce two stereotypical 
decision makers: the Econs, imaginary people who always behave as strictly 
rational expected utility maximizers, and the Humans, real people subject to 
ordinary behavioral biases. The former group accomplishes the Savage (1954) 
"rationality" axioms on the basis of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) (vNM) 
theory that normatively states that an agent should choose the action which 
maximizes her expected utility. For a long time that has been the standard precept 
to model the behavior of agents in financial markets. Yet, much experimental 
evidence has confirmed that in real life individuals do not always act according to 
these “rational” assumptions. Many paradoxes have challenged across the 
centuries, from St. Petersburg’s (Bernoulli, 1738) to Allais (1953). Since 1979 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman developed a non-expected utility theory, the 
so called Prospect Theory (PT) (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), according to 
which the agents may be influenced by “heuristics and bias” and rules of thumb. 
Agents acting in this way are called Humans by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). 
This note aims to shed light on how the target-oriented approach introduced by 
Castagnoli and Li Calzi (1996) may fit well both the Econs and Humans 
behaviors.  
The paper is laid out as follows. In the next section, the target-oriented model is 
discussed. Then in Sec. 3 In Sec. 4, a number of different functionals for different 
agent utility functions is examined. Specifically, we highlight the potentiality of 
the skew-normally distributed ones. Finally, in the last section, concludes the 
note. 
 
2 The normative target-oriented model and simple statistics 
 
   The target-oriented decision-making model has been formally set up by 
Castagnoli and Li Calzi (1996) and subsequently extended by Bordley and Li 
Calzi (2000). To show how it can be applied in real problems we reword a 
decision example discussed by Goldstein et al. (2008) and Donkers et al. (2013).  
Suppose the agent is planning her risky investments she should commit to in view 
of saving for her retirement. She does not know which investment she likes best 
but does know where she wants to retire and the current cost of living (and cost of 
housing) for retirees in that area. She forecasts that the total wealth required for 
this retirement is t. If she were absolutely certain of this forecast, the agent would 
make decisions to deliver a final wealth X that maximizes the probability of 
exceeding t. But because she knows that the cost of living may change, she 
recognizes that the wealth required for retirement must be described by a random 
variable T. As a result, she makes decisions which maximize the probability of X 
exceeding her target T. 
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Let model the desired target by the random variable 𝑇 = 𝑡 + 𝜀, where t is a 
constant that may be interpreted as the expected value of the uncertain goal T and 
 is a zero-mean error term that is stochastically independent of the risky options 
at the disposal to the agent. So the optimization guideline is to pick the risky 
option that maximizes the probability 𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝑇). Suppose that the (stochastically 
independent) target T has distribution function 𝑢(𝑥) and that the final wealth X 
associated with an investment has distribution function 𝐹(𝑥). Then 
𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝑇) = ∫ 𝑃(𝑥 ≥ 𝑇)𝑑𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑢(𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑥)                              (1) 
By Equation (1) the following statement follows (see Castagnoli and LiCalzi, 
1996): to maximizing the probability of meeting a random target 𝑇 = 𝑡 + 𝜀 with 
distribution function 𝑢(𝑥)  is equivalent to maximizing the expected utility 
function 𝑢(𝑥). It is worthwhile noting that Equation (1) was already pinpointed 
by Borch (1968) who using a different terminology states that ranking among 
several possible uncertain insurance prospects to choosing the prospect with 
highest survival probability is equivalent to maximizing the expected utility.  
In conclusion, although Econs and the Humans use a different language, they 
converge in maximizing the same functional (1), e.g. the probability of meeting 
the goal. 
 
3 How to choose the suitable utility function? 
 
   A standard assumption in neoclassical economics is that agents display risk 
aversion at all levels of their wealth. That implies that an agent acting according 
to the vNM axioms be endowed with a concave utility function. That fits the case 
of an Econ agent. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) with the famous adage “losses 
loom larger than gains” formalize the popular belief that people in real life impute 
greater value to a given item when they give it up than when they acquire, e.g. 
they display loss aversion. This “endowment effect” clearly violates the vNM-risk 
aversion axiom. As a substitute to a concave utility function, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) suggest an S-shaped utility function, concave over gains and 
convex over losses, able to grasp the risk aversion and the loss aversion of the 
agent for wealth levels respectively below and above the inflection point. As 
mentioned by Heath et al. (1999), the inflection point represents the goal to hit for 
an S-shaped utility function.  
 
4 From the target distribution vs. the utility function 
 
   In Equation (1) 𝑢(𝑥) is assumed a non-decreasing function to interpret the 
basic rational axiom stating that “agents prefer more to less”, but no restrictions 
are imposed on the concavity. Specifically, according to the Kahneman and 
Tversky PT: (i) agents evaluate outcomes, not according to final wealth levels, but 
according to their perception of gains and losses relative to a reference point, 
typically the desired goal (see Heath et al., 1999). That phenomenon is 
called framing effect; (ii) agents are risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses; 
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and (iii) agents are more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude 
and display loss aversion. It is worthwhile noting that this behavior (i)-(ii)-(iii) 
has been documented in several experimental works (see Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). Condition (ii) means that the utility function is concave over gains and 
convex over losses, e.g. it is an S-shaped function concave for gains above the 
reference point t and convex for losses below the reference point t. That means 
that differences between small gains or losses close to the reference point are 
assigned a high value, whereas differences further away from the reference point 
are assigned smaller values, whereas (iii) implies that the S-shaped utility function 
is steeper for losses than for gains (i.e. tails are not symmetrical respect to the 
reference point). Above can be reworded using the target-based language. Attitude 
(ii) means that the distribution function of the target T is S -shaped (e.g. for a 
Gaussian target). A sufficient condition for S-shaping is that T is unimodal with 
the inflexion point at the mode. However, the two tails of T may not have the 
same curvature. Hence, this kind of utility function is consistent with (iii) as u has 
a steeper slope over losses than over gain. That is the case of a unimodal and 
positively skewed distribution (e.g. for a lognormal target), this implies that the 
probability density for the target has fatter right tail, that implies a behavior that is 
less risk averse over gains than it is risk seeking over losses. 
For an explanatory purpose, let discuss a number of common distributions that 
may fit T. At the end, we propose that of skew-normal that thanks the proper 
modulation of the skewness parameter permits to fit any agent’s risk preferences. 
 
4.1 Exponentially distributed targets for fitting rational Econs  
 
   Let suppose the agent evaluates the stochastic target T is distributed as an 
exponential random variable with parameter 𝜆 > 0 and cumulative distribution 
𝐹(𝑥; 𝜆) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑥 . By (3) that means that the agent is endowed with the 
concave vNM-utility function 𝑈(𝑥; 𝜆) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑥  with constant absolute risk 
aversion coefficient λ. It follows that the risk aversion of the agent is not 
influenced neither by her wealth level nor the probability of hitting the target T. 
So she acts as a Econ. 
 
4.2 Normally distributed targets for fitting behavioral Humans 
 
   Let now the target 𝑇~𝑁(𝑡, 𝜎) be a normal random variable. Since we can 
write 𝑇 = 𝑡 + 𝜀, 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎) is interpretable as a zero-mean white noise about 
the mean t. The distribution function 𝐹(𝑥; 𝑡, 𝜎) =
1
2




 corresponds to a prospect theory S-shaped utility function with inflection point at
x t  in correspondence of the mean value t of T (see Bordley et al., 2014). 
 
4.3 Uniformly distributed targets for fitting risk neutral agents 
 
   Let now the target 𝑇~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) be an uniform random variable, with dis- 
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tribution function 𝐹(𝑥) =
𝑥−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
 for 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑏 , 𝐹(𝑥) = 0  for 𝑥 < 𝑎  and 
𝐹(𝑥) = 1 for 𝑥 ≥ 𝑏. It follows that the agent is endowed with the linear utility 
function 𝑈(𝑥) = 𝐹(𝑥) and she is risk neutral. In such case the expected utility of 
wealth is simply given by a linear function of expected wealth. So, maximizing 
the expected wealth is equivalent to maximizing the probability to exceeding the 
target. 
However to fit the attitudes (i)-(ii)-(iii) we suggest the use of a skewness 
parameter-dependent family, the skew-normal distributions. 
 
4.4 Skew-normally distributed targets for fitting rational Econs and 
behavioral Humans 
 
   The original skew-normal definition is due to Azzalini (1985), and in recent 
years it is becoming in financial and insurance modelling (see Eling, 2012) for a 
recent review see Azzalini (2013). We use an alternative definition as the original 
Azzalini’s one that appears more suitable in this context. A continuous random 
variable X is skew-normally distributed if and only if the following representation 
holds: 
𝑋 = 𝜉 + 𝜔(𝛿|𝑍1| + √1 − 𝛿2𝑍2),       (2) 
 
Where 𝛿 ∈ [−1,1]; 𝑍1 and 𝑍2 are independent standard Normal, and |∙| stands 
for Half-Normal; 𝜉  and 𝜔  (with 𝜔 ≥ 0 ) are the location and the scale 
parameters, respectively. Skew-normal distributions are an extension of normal 
ones, in fact they reduce to the standard normal random variable for 𝛿 = 0 and to 
the Half-Normal when 𝛿 = ±1. Calibrating the parameter 𝛿, called the Azzalini 
skewness parameter, the presence of the Half–Normal |𝑍1| can be weighted on 
one-side tail of X. The more 𝛿 is positive (negative), the more the probability 
mass is pronounced on the right (on the left) tail, so moving 𝛿  the final 
distribution shape changes. Since |𝑍1| has a concave distribution and 𝑍2  a 
S-shaped one, their combination permits to model the tails as desired. The 
skew-normal is unimodal and it is diminishing in sensitivity if 𝛿 < 0. 
In conclusion, modelling the stochastic target T with the skewness-dependent 
Skew Normal distribution permits to suit well both Econs and Humans, in fact: 
 If 𝛿 = ±1, then T coincides with a Half-Normal variable with strictly 
concave distribution function 𝐹(𝑥; 𝜎) = [𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑥
√2𝜎
)], this means that F is the 
utility function of a rational vNM Econ; 
 If 𝛿 = 0 then T coincides with a normal variable with S-shaped distribution 
function F, so the utility function although is s-shaped is symmetrical to the 
reference point t and represents a behavioral PT Human acting; 
 If −1 < 𝛿 < 1 and 𝛿 ≠ 0 then T has an S-shaped distribution function 
with asymmetrically steeped tails. Specifically, if 𝛿 < 0 the probability mass is 
more on the left tail than on the right one. That perfectly captures the loss-adverse 
Human feeling that losses hurt more than gains. 
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In conclusion, it is sufficient to moving the Azzalini’s 𝛿 skewness parameter to 
fit the risk profile of any agent. The advantage in using this class of distributions 
is that it is intuitively understandable the impact of 𝛿  on the shape of the 
probability distribution (see the distribution plotting program developed by 
Adelchi Azzalini available on The Skew-Normal Probability Distribution 
homepage). Moreover, the possible asymmetrical tails of T permit to capture the 




   In this short note we have shown that the target-oriented model may represent 
the decision making of the both rational Econs and behavioral Humans. Due to the 
Equation (1) (see Castagnoli and LiCalzi, 1996; Bordley and LiCalzi, 2000) they 
are maximizers of the probability to exceeding the subjective stochastic target or 
equivalently wording, maximizers of the expected utility/utility function. 
The key difference between the two decision maker groups is the shape of their 
utility/utility function: the Econs accomplishing the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(1947) axioms, so display risk aversion and are endowed with concave utility 
functions, whereas the Humans acting according to the Kahneman and Tversky 
(1991) prospect theory, may display risk aversion and risk seeking at given wealth 
levels. So, their preferences are fit by S-shape utility functions. Moreover if they 
display loss aversion their S-shaped utility functions have different steeped tails. 
Summarizing, the target-oriented approach for decision making: 
 undergoes the optimizing principle according to which agents should choose 
the action which maximizes the probability of meeting the target (Manski, 1988);  
 accomplishes the rational expected utility maximization criterion (see 
Bordley and Li Calzi, 2000); 
 is compatible with the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1991); 
 if the target is assumed skew normally distributed, the steepness of the left 
and right tail of the S-shape utility function can be intuitively regulated by 
choosing the skewness-parameter 𝛿. 
And last but not least, the target-oriented approach has an immediate linkage with 
practice. In fact, using a computer program designed to gaining insight into 
agent’s preferences as the Distribution Builder (DB) developed by Sharpe et al. 
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